The Effects of Fiscal Policies When Incomes are Uncertain:
A Contradiction to Ricardian Equivalence
Martin Feldstein* This paper shows that when earnings are uncertain the substitution of deficit finance for tax finance or the introduction of an unfunded social security program will raise consumption even if all bequests reflect intergenerational altruism. Thus, contrary to the theory developed by Barro (1974) and a number of subsequent writers, an operative bequest motive need not imply Ricardian equivalence. Since there is no uncertainty in the present analysis about the date of each individual's death, this conclusion does not depend on imperfections in annuity markets. Nor does it depend on the existence of non-lump-sum taxes or other distortions. Rather it follows from the result derived below that, when future earnings are uncertain, bequests are also uncertain and that consumption therefore rises more in response to an increase in current disposable income than to an equal present value increase in the disposable income of the next generation.
It is useful to begin with a summary of the reasoning to be developed in this paper. The starting point of the analysis is the observation that the level of earnings during the "second half" of an individual's working life cannot be accurately predicted during the earlier years. This is particularly important among individuals in managerial, entrepreneurial and professional occupations who account for a relatively large share of all savings and bequests. Because of this uncertainty, it is optimal for a younger individual to save more than he would if his expected future income were known with -2-certainty. The uncertainty about future income also implies that an individual during the early stage of his life does not know whether he will later want to make a bequest to his children if he can use an annuity to avoid accidental bequests. But even if all bequests are intended and are motivated only by intergenerational altruism, the uncertainty of the individual's future income means that bequests are uncertain.
This uncertainty of future bequests means that an individual is not indifferent between receiving an additional dollar of income when he is young and having his children later receive an amount with a present value of one dollar. Similarly, a one dollar increase in his current disposable income will increase his current consumption by more than a rise in his children's income with a present value of one dollar. This in turn implies that a tax cut financed by an increase in national debt that will be serviced by future generations will raise current consumption. Similarly, an unfunded social security program that promises a net transfer to the current generation from future generations will also raise current consumption.
Before presenting a formal proof of these propositions, I will review the current state of the debate about Ricardian equivalence in the context of an economy in which there is no uncertainty about individual incomes. This is done in Section 1. The second section then presents a formal model of consumption and bequest decisions of individuals whose earnings during the second half of their working lives are uncertain. Section 3 uses this analysis to examine the effects of fiscal policies that transfer income to the current generation from the next generation. A numerical illustration is presented in Section 4. There is then a brief concluding section.
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The Ricardian Equivalence Theorem
Although several economists over the years noted the possibility that the aggregate national debt might not be regarded as a net asset because of the implied future debt obligation and therefore that a tax cut might not induce an increase in consumption,1 it was Robert Barro (1974) One line of objection to this analysis (see, e.g., James Tobin, 1980, and Martin Feldstein, 1982) is that an operative bequest motive is relatively rare because individuals believe that the marginal utility of their own retirement consumption exceeds the marginal utility of bequests to their children.
Defenders of Ricardian equivalence reply that bequests are In fact relatively common among the upper income groups that account for such a large share of total wealth accumulation and point to the evidence of Laurence Kotlikoff and Lawrence Summers (1981) that most existing wealth can be traced to bequests rather than to life cycle accumulation.
Andrew Abel (1985) and Zvi Eckstein, Martin Eichenbaum and Dan Peled (1985) showed that the observation of substantial bequests does not imply an operative bequest motive if the age at which death occurs is uncertain and an annuity market does not exist. Moreover, in such an economy Ricardian equivalence will be violated and fiscal policies will affect consumption.
However, annuity markets exist and, even with the less than actuarially fair return estimated by Benjamin Friedman and Mark Warshawsky (1985) , older egoistic individuals will prefer annuities to accidental bequests.
Although the observation of bequests in an economy with an annuity market may therefore suggest that there is an operative altruistic bequest motive of the type assumed by Barro, other types of bequest motives have been proposed that do not imply Ricardian equivalence. Douglas Bernstein, Andre Schlaefer, and Lawrence Summers (1986) note that bequests may be made for the "strategic" purpose of maintaining the attention if not the actual affection of children and grandchildren. Laurence Kotlikoff and Avia Spivak (1981) suggest that bequests may be the result of an explicit or implicit contract between aged parents and their children in which the parents agree to leave a bequest if -5-they die before a certain age while the children agree to provide support if the parents live beyond that age and therefore exhaust their assets.
Alternatively, individuals may make bequests because they regard themselves as "stewards" of the funds that they inherited with a moral responsibility to bequeath at least a similar amount to their own children. Each of these models implies that a fiscal transfer from children to parents (i.e., a tax cut or an increase in social security retirement benefits) will not be offset by an equivalent increase in bequests.
Economists will of course differ in the extent to which they accept the strategic bequest, family annuity or stewardship theories as an explanation of observed bequests. Although I believe that there is probably some truth in each of these explanations, I doubt that they can explain the observed bequests without reference also to intergenerational altruism. The stewardship theory cannot explain the bequests of those who did not receive inheritances. The family annuity theory may be relevant to some moderate income individuals who are likely to exhaust their assets during retirement
but cannot be applied to the wealthy aged whose assets continue to increase as they get older because their spending is less than their income. The strategic bequest theory is more difficult to reject as the primary explanation of observed bequests but is contrary to the persuasive "evidence" fundamentally different from that of the current paper because they do not consider the effect of an individual's own income uncertainty on his desired level of bequests. Moreover, the non-lump-sum nature of the taxes that they consider inevitably introduce a non-neutrality. Abel (1986) shows how a different type of non-lump-sum tax, a progressive tax on bequests or capital, changes the relative cost of current consumption and bequests and thus introduces an incentive to consume more at the present time.
The present paper shows that none of these departures from the original Barro formulation is necessary to demonstrate that Ricardian equivalence is false and that a fiscally mandated intergenerational transfer from the future to the present implies an increase in current consumpton. Consider therefore a model in which the individual lives two periods. In the first period he works a fixed amount and receives a certain income which includes any bequest that he receives. In the second period he also works a fixed amount but earns an amount y2 that cannot be predicted during the first period of life. The second period of life also contains a fixed interval of retirement before death at a known time. Since the amount of work 1n the first and second periods and the duration of retirement are all fixed, these quantities need not be specified explicitly. Moreover, the assumption The simplest specification of the stochastic nature of second period income is that the individual receives a fixed amount with probability p and receives zero with probability 1 -p. It will also eliminate unnecessary notation without changing anything fundamental to assume that the interest rate is zero.
In the first period of life, the individual chooses first period consumption (c1) to maximize expected utility. In the second period, the individual observes either y2 = or y2 = 0 and, conditional on that It will be convenient to restate this with the uncertain second period income replaced by its certainty equivalent (x2) defined by the condition that the maximum expected utility that is possible with the parameters z1 + B, Z2
and p is equal to the maximum utility that the individual would obtain subject to the nonstochastic budget constraint that lifetime consumption is not greater than z1 + B + x2.
Thus q(z1+B,Z2,p) = J,(z1+B+x2).
Since bequests are added to the nonstochastic first period income (z1) in both specifications, the substitution of the certainty equivalent does not alter the conclusions of the analysis.
With these assumptions, the first period problem of an individual in the current generation is to choose c1 to maximize E[u(c1,c2,4,(z1+B+x2))] knowing that in the second period he will choose c2 and B to maximize u(c,c2,js(z1+B+x2)) where c? is the value of c1 chosen in period 1. Note that a positive bequest will be chosen at time 2 only if u3' > u2 at B = 0, i.e., if the marginal utility of the first dollar of bequest exceeds the marginal -10-utility of an additional dollar of consumption when the bequest level is zero.
The interesting case explored below is the one in which this condition holds when y2 = but does not hold when y2 = 0, i.e., when the bequest is made only when the second period income exceeds its expected value.
To derive explicit parametric and numerical results, I assume that the utility function is log-linear:
(1)
where a reflects the weight that the current generation assigns to the logarithm of the certainty equivalent income of their prospective heirs. To find the value of C1 that maximizes expected utility, the individual must follow the stochastic dynamic programming principle of solving the second period problem first and then using the optimal conditional values of c2 and B to find the optimal value of c1. From the vantage point of the second period, c1 is fixed at c and c2, B must be chosen to maximize in c2 + aln(z1+B+x2) subject to the budget constraint y1 + V2
A positive bequest will be optimal if and only if
1 0< a y1+y2-c1 zl+x2
i.e., if the marginal utility of c2 evaluated at B = 0 is less than the marginal utility of increased second generation income, also evaluated at B = 0. The only interesting case in the current analysis is the one in which a bequest is optimal when y2 = V2 but not optimal when y2 = 0:
This case will be assumed in the analysis that follows.4
Thus y2 = 0 implies B* = 0 and c = y1-C? while y2 = V2 implies that 8* maximizes in c2 + aln(z1+B+x2) subject to the constraint that
The first order condition is Thus when second period income is high enough to make a positive bequest optimal, the available resources of the two generations are divided in the ratio a to 1 implied by the parameters of the utility function.
These conditional values of B and c2 can now be substituted into equation
(1) with probability weights p and 1 -p to derive the optimal value of c1. Thus
E(u) = in c1 + p(1n(1+a1(Y1+Y2+z1+x2-c1) + aln(a/1+a)(y1+Y2+z1+x2-c1)]
+ (1-p)(ln(y1-c1) + aln(z1+x2)].
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The first order condition for the optimal value of c1 is thus:
or, equivalently, the quadratic equation:
(2i-pa)c!2 -((2-p)(yl+Y2+zl+x2) + (1+p+pa)y ]c* + y1(y1+Y2+z1+x2) = 0.
Before analyzing the implications of (9) for the effects of fiscal policy, it is useful to derive the optimal consumption and bequests in the same model but without the uncertainty of second period income. If the individual knows with certainty at the beginning of his life that his second period income will be pY2 (i.e., the mean of the uncertain distribution), he will choose c1, c2 and B to maximize ln c1 + in C2 + ain(z1+x2+B) subject to the budget constraint c1 + c2 + B = y1 
The Effects of Fiscal Policies -
We are now ready to analyze how recognizing the uncertainty of second period income alters the effects of fiscal policy. Consider therefore a tax cut that raises the first period disposable income of the initial generation (y1) and increases the national debt that must be repaid by reducing the first period disposable income of their children (z1). Since the interest rate is assumed equal to zero, the debt repayment is equal to the initial tax cut:
Equation (10) shows that in the case of certainty this fiscal policy has no effect on the first period consumption of the initial generation: dc1 = 0 because c1 depends only on the combined endowment of both generations
and that is unaffected by increasing y1 and decreasing z1 by equal amounts. This is the fundamental Ricardian equivalence result of Barro. In contrast, equation (9) shows that when the uncertainty of second period income is recognized a fiscal change that raises y1 and reduces z1 by an equal amount will not leave c1 unchanged. More specifically, a tax cut that raises y1 but leaves y1 + z1 unchanged will raise first period consumption. To see this, note that the solution to equation (9) 
4(2+pcz)(y1+Y2+z1+x2)y1
Since the denominator is positive, dc/dy1 > 0 if yl + V2 + z1 + x2 (15) c* < 1 1+p+pa
But equation (10) showed that when there is no uncertainty about second period mci +h rni-4mI r i r** = (V +nY+, 4-i /(4qT1 -cm11ir run+l-I +hri
the right hand side of (15) since for any p < 1, 2 + a > 1 + p + pa and pY2 < 2• Moreover, the existence of second period income uncertainty increases precautionary saving in the first period and therefore implies that c < Cr. Since c < Cr and cr < (y1+V2+z1+x2)/(1+p+pa), inequality (15) is satisfied and therefore dc1/dy > 0; a tax cut balanced by a tax increase on the next generation raises current spending.
Before pursuing the formal analysis any further, it is desirable to ask why income uncertainty causes Ricardian equivalence to fail. When second period income is uncertain, the individual does not know at the time that he chooses c1 whether he will ultimately want to make a bequest. If he knew with certainty that he was not going to make a bequest, the extra tax borne by the next generation would be irrelevant to him and he could divide his tax cut between his own consumption in the first and second periods. More generally, the individual raises his first period consumption (although by less than the increase in disposable income), knowing that with probability 1 -p he will not want to make a bequest and will raise his second period consumption by the remainder. With probability p the individual will have -15-high income in the second period, will therefore choose to make a bequest, and will use some of his additional first period saving to make a larger bequest than he would otherwise have made. Nevertheless, the tax cut raises total consumption of the initial generation and reduces total consumption of the next generation even when a bequest is made.
To see this explicitly, note that equation (5) implies that, when a bequest is to be made, an increase in y1 and an equal decrease in z1 implies that the next generation's consumption is reduced by a fraction of the induced consumption:
Since there is no offsetting change in bequest when y2 = 0 and B* = 0, the average chan9e in second generation income In response to a current tax cut financed by a tax increase on the second generation is
The analysis of social security retirement benefits is essentially identical in the current context to the analysis of the tax cut. Consider a program that pays a sure benefit to the current generation In its second period and finances this by a tax of on the income of the next generation. When there is no income uncertainty, the social security program raises second period income to p?2 + and reduces the next generation's initial earnings to 21 -, leaving c!* in equation (10) unchanged. In the case of uncertain second period income, the payment of a sure second period benefit is analytically identical to a tax cut. To see this, note that y2 = 0 now implies = y1-c + so that the payment of the second period benefit is the same as an increase in first period income if it induces the same c?. Similarly, when y2 = Y2, the individual maximizes in c2 + a1n(z1-+B+x2) subject to the constraint that C2 + B = y1 + V2 + -c?; this is also identical to the effect of a tax cut that increases y1 and decreases z1 as long as it yields the same c. To see that the optimal first period consumption is indeed the same, note that the expression to be maximized in equation (7) 
A Numerical Illustration
A numerical example will illustrate the potential effect of income uncertainty on consumption, on bequests, and on the impact of fiscal policy.
The specific example is obviously arbitrary but indicates the potential importance of income uncertainty. In the example, the marginal propensity to consume out of the tax-induced increase in disposable income is almost as large as the average propensity to consume.
Since the results are essentially independent of the Units of measurement, I set first period income equal to unity: y1 = 1. With p = 0.5 and V2 = 2, the expected value of second period income is also one. The economic specification is completed by setting the next generation's first When second period income is uncertain, the optimal value of c1 is given by equation (13). With a = 1, c = 0.6311 while a = 3 implies ct = 0.5937.
In both cases, first period consumption is substantially less than it would be if the same expected second period income could be anticipated with certainty.
This reflects both the precautionary demand for saving (against the risk that = 0) and the saving for subsequent bequests (if y2 = 2).
If y2 = 0, the individual will choose to make no bequest with a = 1 or with a = 3. In contrast, if y2 = 2 the individual will choose a bequest of 8* = 0.1844 with a = 1 and 8* = 1.3047 with a = 3. Thus with a = 1 the income uncertainty increases the average bequest from B = 0 to pB* = 0.0922 and with a = 3 the income uncertainty increases the average bequest from = 0.40 to p8* = 0.6524.
Consider now the effect of a fiscal policy that increases the initial generation's first period disposable income from y1 = 1.0 to y1 = 1.1 and reduces the corresponding disposable income of the next generation from = 1.0 to z1 = .9. This raises the first period consumption from 
Concluding Comment
This paper has shown that the inability of individuals to predict accurately their subsequent earnings implies that fiscal transfers from future generations to the current generation will raise current consumption. Thus earnings uncertainty is incompatible with Ricardian equivalence. The individual's uncertainty of his future income also reduces consumption and increases the probability and expected size of bequests.
Unlike the uncertainty that arises because the time of death is unknown, the unpredictability of individual future income cannot be avoided even in principle by an annuity market or other insurance market. This group includes Don Patinkin (1956 ), Martin Bailey (1971 , and Merton Miller and C. Upton (1974) . It is not clear whether David Ricardo actually believed this to be true; see Ricardo (1951) and Gerald O'Driscoll (1977) .
2.
Although there have been several analyses of life cycle models with uncertain income and asset returns (see, e.g., Agnar Sandmo (1970) , Jacques Dreze and Franco Modigliani (1972) and Robert Barsky, Gregory Mankiw and
Stephen Zeldes (1986)), these have not dealt with the relation between income uncertainty and bequests.
3.
For such an analysis, see Feldstein (1987) .
4.
The case where a bequest is always optimal corresponds to the original Barro analysis despite the income uncertainty while the case where a bequest is never optimal is contrary to the observation that individuals do make bequests.
5.
This is the only feasible solution of the quadratic equation; adding instead of subtracting the square root expression implies a value of c1 greater than initial income.
6.
This assumes that the size of the second period benefit is not so large that the individual wants to consume more than his entire first period income.
In this case, it is still true that the benefit increases first period consumption but by less than the rise that would result from an equally large tax reduction.
